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Continuous-variable quantum key distribution with Gaussian source noise
Yujie Shen, Xiang Peng,∗ Jian Yang, and Hong Guo†
CREAM Group, State Key Laboratory of Advanced Optical Communication
Systems and Networks (Peking University) and Institute of Quantum Electronics,
School of Electronics Engineering and Computer Science, Peking University, Beijing 100871, PR China
Source noise affects the security of continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV QKD), and is difficult
to analyze. We propose a model to characterize Gaussian source noise through introducing a neutral party (Fred)
who induces the noise with a general unitary transformation. Without knowing Fred’s exact state, we derive the
security bounds for both reverse and direct reconciliations and show that the bound for reverse reconciliation is
tight.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Continuous-variable quantum key distribution helps two re-
mote parties (Alice and Bob) to establish a set of secret keys
at high speed [1]. Different from discrete-variable protocols,
in CV QKD Alice encodes information into the quadratures
of the optical field and Bob decodes it with high-efficiency
and high-speed homodyne detection [2–4]. Besides the ex-
perimental advantages and demonstrations, the security of CV
QKD is also studied theoretically. The coherent-state CV-
QKD protocol with Gaussian modulation has been proved se-
cure under the collective attack [5–9], and the fact that the
security bounds for collective and coherent attacks coincide
asymptotically has been clarified using quantum De Finetti
theorem [1, 10]. However, the security of practical CV-QKD
system has only been noticed recently [11, 12]. It has been ob-
served that adding noise in the error-correction postprocessing
may increase the secret key rate [13]. Furthermore, Filip et
al. noticed that the source noise in coherent state preparation
would undermine the key rate [14, 15]. More recently, Weed-
brook et al. has shown that direct reconciliation CV protocols
is more robust against this noise than reverse reconciliation
protocols [16].
From a practical viewpoint, it is meaningful to consider
the trusted Gaussian source noise which is not controlled by
the potential eavesdropper Eve. To analyze this source-noise
effect, it is convenient to use the entanglement-based (EB)
scheme to evaluate CV-QKD security. Note that two require-
ments for the EB scheme should be satisfied here. First, the
EB scheme is kept equivalent to the practical prepare and mea-
sure (PM) scheme [17]. Second, in the EB scheme the opti-
mality of Gaussian attack is guaranteed under the collective
attack. From this viewpoint, a three-mode entangled-state
model has been proposed in [18] as a preliminary attempt.
However, the security bound in that paper is not tight, since in
order to derive a calculable bound the model assumes that the
source noise is untrusted, from which Eve is able to acquire
extra information. Another attempt [15] used a beam-splitter
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model [Fig. 1(a)], analogous to the realistic detector model
[11], to characterize the source noise.
In this paper, we propose a novel EB model to characterize
the Gaussian source noise. In this model a neutral party Fred
introduces Gaussian source noise through a general Gaussian
transformation. Without knowing Fred’s exact state, a secu-
rity bound can be derived which is tighter than previous work
[18]. We also analyze the performance of the beam-splitter
model under situations where source noise process includes
either signal amplification or attenuation, and make compar-
isons with our result.
II. MODEL DESCRIPTION
Before the explicit description of our model, the defini-
tion of the covariance matrix of a quantum state is briefly re-
viewed. For an N-mode quantum state, its covariance matrix
γ is defined by
γi j = Tr[ρ{(rˆi − di), (rˆ j − d j)}], (1)
where the operator vector is rˆ = (xˆ1, pˆ1, xˆ2, pˆ2, . . . , xˆN , pˆN)
and the displacement vector is di = Tr(ρrˆi) (d ∈ R2N). xˆi and
pˆi are the quadratures of each optical field mode.
The EB scheme of the beam-splitter model and our model
is illustrated in Fig. 1. In the beam-splitter model the source
is characterized by an EPR state held by Alice. Then an ex-
tra EPR state interacts with either mode of the original one,
depending on whether the source noise process amplifies or
attenuates the signal, to introduce the noise. This is shown in
Fig. 1(a) and Fig. 1(b).
Our model is demonstrated in Fig. 1(c) where the source
is also characterized by an EPR state. Alice obtains the data
by measuring one of mode A and sends the other one B0 to
Bob as the signal. We assume that Gaussian source noise is
introduced by Fred who implements a unitary Gaussian trans-
formation over F0 and the signal B0. The covariance matrix
of the Gaussian state ρFAB1 describing Fred-Alice-Bob system
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FIG. 1: (a) Beam-splitter model with signal attenuation. An extra
EPR state is presented and one mode of which is coupled with the
signal mode to introduce the source noise. This is similar to the con-
ventional detector model [11]. (b) Beam-splitter model with signal
amplification. The extra EPR state intervenes through coupling the
mode sent to Alice and parameters are adjusted so that the EB scheme
is equivalent to the PM scheme. (c) Our model. A neutral party Fred
is presented who implements a unitary Gaussian transformation to
introduce the source noise to the signal. The capital letters represent
quantum states at each position.
after the transformation is
γFAB1 =

F11 F12 F13 F14
F21 F22 F23 F24
F31 F32 VI
√
TA(V2 − 1)σz
F41 F42
√
TA(V2 − 1)σz TA(V + χA)I
 ,
(2)
where V is the variance of the EPR state, TA and χA charac-
terize the influence of the Gaussian source noise on the signal
mode, I is the 2 × 2 identity matrix, σz is the Pauli-z matrix,
and each Fi j represents an unknown 2 × 2 matrix describing
either F or its correlations with AB1.
With using the coherent-state protocol as an example, the
equivalence between the EB scheme and the practical PM
scheme is explained below. In the EB scheme Alice performs
a heterodyne detection on her side and gets two measurement
results PA and XA. Bob’s state ρB1 would be projected into a
Gaussian state with covariance matrix γB1 and mean dB1 satis-
fying [19]
γB1 = TA(χA + 1)I,
dB1 =
√
2TA(V − 1)
V + 1
(XA,−PA).
(3)
In the PM scheme Alice originally prepares the signal mode
B0 in a coherent state with displacement vector dB1/
√
TA.
Then, the effect of the source noise can be described by
pˆB1 =
√
TA( pˆB0 + δP) and xˆB1 =
√
TA(xˆB0 + δX), in which
δP and δX are uncorrelated noise terms with zero mean and
variance V(δP) = V(δX) = χA. The state sent to Bob is then
identical to the one described in Eq. (3), indicating that source
preparation in the real PM scheme can be properly character-
ized using the EB scheme. As the source-noise effect goes to
zero, the equivalence would be identical to the one described
in [17].
When the signal is sent through the channel, the attack of
the potential eavesdropper Eve can be described as performing
a unitary transformation UBE over the signal mode B1 and her
modes. After Eve’s interaction, the covariance matrix of the
state ρFAB would be
γFAB =
F11 F12 F13 F′14
F21 F22 F23 F′24
F31 F32 VI
√
TTA(V2 − 1)σz
F′41 F
′
42
√
TTA(V2 − 1)σz T [TA(V + χA) + χ]I
 ,
(4)
where T and χ are channel parameters and F′i j indicates the
changed correlation terms due to Eve’s interaction. Note that
since γFAB is partly unknown but fixed, we can prove the opti-
mality of Gaussian attack, as shown in Appendix A. In the fol-
lowing, the lower bounds on the secret key rate of this model
would be derived without knowing the exact state of Fred in
both reverse and direct reconciliations.
III. REVERSE RECONCILIATION
In reverse reconciliation, the secret key rate is given by
KRR = I(a : b) − S (b : E), (5)
where I(a : b) is classical mutual information between Al-
ice and Bob and S (b : E) is quantum mutual information
between Bob and Eve. Given the above covariance matrix
γFAB, I(a : b) can be calculated from the reduced matrix γAB,
while S (b : E) can not be learned directly from γFAB since
Fi j contains undetermined parameters. Fortunately, another
Gaussian state ρ′FAB with determined covariance matrix γ′FAB
exists, and serves as an upper bound on the calculation of the
quantity S (b : E). γ′FAB has the form
γ′FAB =
I 0 0 0
0 I 0 0
0 0 TA(V + χA)I
√
T [T 2A(V + χA)2 − 1]σz
0 0
√
T [T 2A(V + χA)2 − 1]σz T [TA(V + χA) + χ]I

.
(6)
The relationship between two Gaussian states with γFAB and
γ′FAB is explained below. Considering the pure Gaussian state
3ρ′FAB1 with the covariance matrix
γ′FAB1 =
I 0 0 0
0 I 0 0
0 0 TA(V + χA)I
√
T 2A(V + χA)2 − 1σz
0 0
√
T 2A(V + χA)2 − 1σz TA(V + χA)I

.
(7)
The reduced state ρ′B1 = TrFA(ρ′FAB1 ) is identical to the re-
duced state ρB1 = TrFA(ρFAB1 ), so ρ′FAB1 and ρFAB1 are two
different purifications of this state. According to [20], one pu-
rification of a fixed system can be transformed into another
through a local unitary transformation on its ancillary system.
Hence there exists such a unitary map UFA that transforms
ρFAB1 to ρ
′
FAB1 . Furthermore, after taking Eve’s attack UBE
into account and noticing that UFA and UBE commute, it can
be proved that ρFAB will be transformed into ρ′FAB through
UFA .
In the rest of the paper expressions with the prime indicate
the terms calculated by γ′FAB. The following lemma then al-
lows us to bound Eve’s knowledge.
Lemma 1. Given two Gaussian states ρFAB and ρ′FAB with
covariance matrices γFAB and γ′FAB shown in Eqs. (4) and (6),
respectively, one has the equality
S (b : E) = S ′(b : E). (8)
Proof. Based on γFAB and γ′FAB the mutual information be-
tween Bob and Eve is, respectively, given as
S (b : E) = S (E) − S (E | b),
S ′(b : E) = S ′(E) − S ′(E | b), (9)
where S (E) and S ′(E) are the von Neumann entropy of Eve’s
state, and S (E | b) and S ′(E | b) are Eve’s entropy con-
ditioned on Bob’s measurement results. S (E) = S (F, A, B)
and S ′(E) = S ′(F, A, B) can be verified from the fact that
Eve could purify the Fred-Alice-Bob system [19]. Because
ρFAB can be changed into ρ′FAB through a unitary transforma-
tion UFA , the von Neumann entropy S (F, A, B) = S ′(F, A, B),
and thus S (E) = S ′(E). On the other hand, condition-
ing on Bob’s result b, the conditional state with γFA|B=b
can be transformed into the one with γ′FA|B=b through UFA ,
and thus S (F, A | b) = S ′(F, A | b). Combining an-
other fact that S (E | b) = S (F, A | b) and S ′(E | b) =
S ′(F, A | b), we conclude that S (b : E) = S ′(b : E).

Lemma 1 implies that calculation with γ′FAB can bound
Eve’s knowledge. Note that Eq. (8) is valid for protocols
implementing either squeezed-state or coherent-state protocol
with Bob using homodyne or heterodyne detection. Hence our
model provides a tight security bound for all these protocols
in reverse reconciliation.
IV. DIRECT RECONCILIATION
Though direct reconciliation has the 3dB limit, the security
bounds for the sqeezed-state protocol with homodyne detec-
tion and the no-switching protocol [4] are analyzed theoreti-
cally. In direct reconciliation, the secret key rate is given by
KDR = I(a : b) − S (a : E). (10)
I(a : b) can be calculated from γAB, and S (a : E) can be
bounded by the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Given two Gaussian states ρFAB and ρ′FAB with
covariance matrices γFAB and γ′FAB, the following inequality
can be verified
S (a : E) ≤ S ′(a : E). (11)
The proof can be seen in Appendix B. Note that the equality
in Eq. (11) is achieved only when F is independent of E,
which is not necessarily satisfied in practice. This means that
in order to bound the secret key rate, Eve’s knowledge about
Alice is overestimated by using S ′(a : E). Thus, the security
bound derived here is not tight.
V. NUMERICAL SIMULATION
Our simulation concerns the no-switching protocol in both
reverse and direct reconciliations. The secret key rate KDR
or KRR would depend on the variables V , TA, χA, T and χ
characterizing either source or channel influences. In the sim-
ulation the variance is set to V = 20 and channel excess
noise ǫ = Tχ − 1 + T = 0.04 close to the practical sce-
nario [11], where electronic noise in Bob’s detection is simply
treated as part of ǫ. In addition, to analyze both signal attenu-
ation and amplification cases the source parameters are set to
ǫA = TAχA − 1 + TA = 0.1 and TA = 0.9 or TA = 1.1 with
regard to each process.
The secret key rate is calculated using our model, the un-
trusted source noise model, and the beam-splitter model. The
mutual information I(a : b) is calculated according to the pro-
tocol used, whose formula can be found in [19]. S (a : E) and
S (b : E) in our model can be bounded using the simplified
covariance matrix γ′FAB. To deal with the untrusted source
noise, Fred is assumed to be part of Eve, and thus S (a : E)
and S (b : E) are derived from γAB [18]. For the beam-splitter
model the key rate is calculated with the covariance matrix in-
cluding the ancillary modes, which is given in Eqs. (C1) and
(C3) in Appendix C.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The simulation results can be seen in Figs. 2 and 3, where
performances of our model, the beam-splitter model, and the
untrusted source noise model are shown under no-switching
protocol in reverse and direct reconciliations. From Figs. 2
and 3, it is clearly seen that the secret key rate of our model
(solid line) coincides with that of the beam-splitter model
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FIG. 2: Secret key rate as a function of the transmittance of the chan-
nel in no-switching protocol with reverse reconciliation. The solid
line stands for our model, dashed line for the beam-splitter model,
and dotted line for the untrusted source noise model. Data are ac-
quired under the variance of V = 20, and channel’s excess noise is
chosen to be ǫ = 0.04. (a) Signal attenuation with source param-
eter TA = 0.9 and ǫA = 0.1. (b) Signal amplification with source
parameter TA = 1.1 and ǫA = 0.1
.
(dashed line) in reverse reconciliation, while in direct recon-
ciliation our result is lower. In addition, the security bound
of our model is significantly higher than the untrusted source
noise model (dotted line) in all cases.
In the reverse reconciliation case (as shown in Fig. 2) the
coincidence of our model and the beam-splitter model on the
secret key rate means that our model provides a tight security
bound, even by generalizing Fred’s interaction. This coinci-
dence is due to the fact that both models provide the same
signal state, and the information leakage to Eve is estimated
through this state. In the direct reconciliation shown in Fig.
3, we remark that our bound on the secret key rate can be
further improved since the information gained by Eve is over-
estimated in mathematical treatment.
In conclusion, we have proposed a model to characterize
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FIG. 3: Secret key rate as a function of the transmittance of the chan-
nel in no-switching protocol with direct reconciliation. The solid
line stands for our model, dashed line for the beam-splitter model,
and dotted line for the untrusted source noise model. Data are ac-
quired under the variance of V = 20, and channel’s excess noise is
chosen to be ǫ = 0.04. (a) signal attenuation with source parameter
TA = 0.9 and ǫA = 0.1. (b) signal amplification with source parame-
ter TA = 1.1 and ǫA = 0.1
.
the general Gaussian source noise in CV QKD. The result co-
incides with that of the beam-splitter model in reverse rec-
onciliation protocols, proving that our generalized model can
provide a tight bound on the secret key rate. In direct reconcil-
iation, though the security bound is not tight, it still surpasses
that of the untrusted source noise model in a significant way.
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Appendix A: Optimality of Gaussian Attack
Here, in our model, the security analysis on the optimal-
ity of Gaussian collective attack needs to be rechecked be-
cause the neutral party Fred is introduced in the EB scheme.
Given the state ρFAB with covariance matrix γFAB, it can be
demonstrated that the security bound is obtained by consider-
ing Gaussian attack. The reason is listed as follows.
In Eqs. (5) and (10) I(a : b) is lower bounded by Gaussian
attack [8]. As for S (a : E) in direct reconciliation, considering
Bob and Fred together as a larger state B∗, thus S (a : E) =
S (E) − S (E | a) = S (A, B∗) − S (B∗ | a). According to [8],
S (a : E) reaches its maximum when the quantum state ρAB∗
or ρFAB is Gaussian, with covariance matrix γFAB. Therefore,
Gaussian attack is optimal for direct reconciliation protocols.
The deduction for the reverse reconciliation protocols follows
a similar route.
Note that, in practical PM scheme, the source noise in-
cluding light intensity fluctuation from a laser or modulator
is a Gaussian one, thus the analysis is limited to the situation
where Fred performs a general Gaussian transformation.
Appendix B: Proof of Ineq. (11)
The mutual information between Alice and Eve is given by
S (a : E) = S (E) − S (E | a),
S ′(a : E) = S ′(E) − S ′(E | a), (B1)
where the equation S (E) = S ′(E) can be verified with simi-
lar reason demonstrated in Sec. III. Furthermore, we use the
relations
S (E | a) ≥ S (E | a, f ), (B2)
S (E | a, f ) ≥ S ′(E | a, f ), (B3)
S ′(E | a, f ) = S ′(E | a), (B4)
where S (E | a, f ) (S ′(E | a, f )) means Eve’s entropy condi-
tioned on the measurement results a (a′) and f ( f ′) of Alice
and Fred. Here, Eq. (B4) is obtained by noticing that in Eq.
(6) Fred is uncorrelated with the rest of the system, that is,
ρ′FABE = ρ
′
F
⊗
ρ′ABE , so [20]
S ′(E | a, f ) = S ′(E; a, f ) − S ′(a, f )
= S ′(E; a) + S ′( f ) − [S ′(a) + S ′( f )]
= S ′(E | a). (B5)
On the other hand, Eq. (B2) holds because of the strong sub-
additivity of the von Neumann entropy [20]. Furthermore, the
equation
S (E | a, f ) = S ′(E | a, f ), (B6)
can be verified in the squeezed-state protocol with homodyne
detection, while
S (E | a, f ) ≥ S ′(E | a, f ), (B7)
holds in the no-switching protocol. Because both Gaussian
states ρFABE and ρ′FABE are pure states, one has
S (E | a, f ) = S (B | a, f ),
S ′(E | a, f ) = S ′(B | a, f ). (B8)
With using Eq. (B8), Eq. (B6) and InEq. (B7) are explained
below.
(1) In the squeezed-state protocol with homodyne detec-
tion, S (B | a, f ) = S ′(B | a, f ) can be verified through proving
γ
a f
B = γ
′a f
B , in which γ
a f
B (γ′a fB ) means the covariance matrix
of the state ρB (ρ′B) conditioning on the measurement results a(a′) and f ( f ′) of the state ρFA (ρ′FA). The covariance matrix
γ
a f
B can be obtained by [19]
γ
a f
B = γB − σB−FA(XγFAX)MPσTB−FA, (B9)
where σB−FA, γFA and γB denote part of γFAB
γFAB =
(
γFA σ
T
B−FA
σB−FA γB
)
, (B10)
and X is a matrix of the form
X =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0

, (B11)
which stands for the homodyne detection process on the x
quadrature. Note that the situation where the p quadrature
is measured has been omitted as its analysis would be identi-
cal to the x quadrature case. The unitary transformation UFA
corresponds in phase-space to a symplectic operation S [19],
and therefore γ′FAB = (S
⊕
IB)γFAB(S
⊕
IB)T . Combining
Eq. (B9), γ′a fB would then be
γ′a fB = γB − σB−FAS T (XS γFAS T X)MPSσTB−AF . (B12)
Without loss of generality, we assume S takes a general form
[19]
S =

a 0 b 0 c 0
0 a′ 0 b′ 0 c′
d 0 e 0 f 0
0 d′ 0 e′ 0 f ′
g 0 h 0 i 0
0 g′ 0 h′ 0 i′

, (B13)
and hence satisfying S X = XS . Therefore, one has
(XS γAFS T X)MP = (S XγAF XS T )MP
= (S T )−1(XγAFX)MP(S )−1, (B14)
according to the characteristics of the Moore-Penrose pseu-
doinverse of matrix [21]. Observing Eqs. (B9), (B12) and
(B14), γa fB = γ′a fB , which means S (B | a, f ) = S ′(B | a, f ).
According to Eq. (B8), the validity of Eq. (B6) is proved.
6(2) In the no-switching protocol, InEq. (B7) is verified by
comparing the explicit von Neumann entropy calculated from
the two covariance matrices γ′a fB and γ
a f
B . Starting from ρ
′
FAB
, γ′a fB can be written as [19]
γ′a fB = γ
′
B − σ′B−FA(γ′FA + I)−1σ′TB−FA
= {T [TA(V + χA) + χ] −
T [T 2A(V + χA)2 − 1]
TA(V + χA) + 1 }I,
(B15)
where I is the 2×2 identity matrix. On the other hand,
γ
a f
B = γ
′
B − σ′B−FA(S −1)T [S −1γ′FA(S −1)T + I]−1S −1σ′TB−FA.
(B16)
For the symplectic transformation S −1, a decomposition of
the form S −1 = PS rQ exists, which is known as the Bloch-
Messiah reduction [22]. Here, S r is a squeezing operator on
each mode
S r =

es1 0 0 0 0 0
0 e−s1 0 0 0 0
0 0 es2 0 0 0
0 0 0 e−s2 0 0
0 0 0 0 es3 0
0 0 0 0 0 e−s3

, (B17)
and P and Q stand for two passive transformations satisfying
PT P = I and QT Q = I. Without loss of generality, matrix Q
takes a general form
Q =

a 0 b 0 c 0
0 a′ 0 b′ 0 c′
d 0 e 0 f 0
0 d′ 0 e′ 0 f ′
g 0 h 0 i 0
0 g′ 0 h′ 0 i′

. (B18)
With implementing the orthogonality of the passive transfor-
mation P, one has
γ
a f
B = γ
′
B − σ′B−FAQT S rT (S rQγ′FAQT S rT + I)−1S rQσ′B−FAT
= T [TA(V + χA) + χ]I −

T [T 2A(V+χA)2−1]
TA(V+χA)−1+ 1W
0
0 T [T
2
A(V+χA)2−1]
TA(V+χA)−1+ 11−W
 ,
(B19)
where letter W represents
W =
e2s1c2
e2s1 + 1
+
e2s2 f 2
e2s2 + 1
+
e2s3 i2
e2s3 + 1
,
1 − W = c
2
e2s1 + 1
+
f 2
e2s2 + 1
+
i2
e2s3 + 1
.
(B20)
Using QT Q = I, W takes its value within 0 < W < 1. To
calculate its entropy, note that the von Neumann entropy of a
Gaussian state ρ is given by
S (ρ) =
∑
i
g(λi − 1
2
), (B21)
where g(x) = (x + 1) log2(x + 1)− x log2(x) and λi is the sym-
plectic eigenvalue of the covariance matrix of ρ. It can then
be shown that the von Neumann entropy of γa fB increases as its
symplectic eigenvalue increases. Furthermore, the symplectic
eigenvalue of γa fB is the square of the multiplication of its di-
agonal entries, and the minimum of this eigenvalue is reached
when W = 12 in γ
a f
B = γ
′a f
F . This yields InEq. (B7) in the
no-switching protocol.
Appendix C: Beam-Splitter Model under Gaussian Channel
The secret key rate of the beam-splitter model is to be cal-
culated with signal attenuation or amplification, respectively.
In case of attenuation (TA < 1) the model is shown in Fig. 1(a)
[15] and the result is obtained by setting the parameters in Eq.
(4) as
γFGAB =

N
√
TA(N2 − 1)σz 0 −
√
T (1 − TA)(N2 − 1)σz√
TA(N2 − 1)σz [TAN + (1 − TA)V]I
√
(1 − TA)(V2 − 1)σz
√
TTA(1 − TA)(V − N)I
0
√
(1 − TA)(V2 − 1)σz VI
√
TTA(V2 − 1)σz
−
√
T (1 − TA)(N2 − 1)σz
√
TTA(1 − TA)(V − N)I
√
TTA(V2 − 1)σz T [TA(V + χA) + χ]I

, (C1)
where N is the variance of the ancillary EPR’ shown in Fig. 1(a), which is related to the source parameters through N =
TAχA/(1 − TA). Using this specific form of γFAB, Eve’s knowledge S (E) − S (E | a) can be calculated by implementing the
7relation
S (E) − S (E | a) = S (FGAB) − S (FGB | a). (C2)
In case of amplification (TA > 1), one needs to modify the parameter setting, and change the model according to Fig. 1(b).
Under this situation, the global covariance matrix reads
γFGAB =

NB
√
TB(N2B − 1)σz −
√
(1 − TB)(N2B − 1)σz 0√
TB(N2B − 1)σz [TBNB + (1 − TB)VB]I
√
TB(1 − TB)(VB − NB)I
√
T (1 − TB)(V2B − 1)σz
−
√
(1 − TB)(N2B − 1)σz
√
TB(1 − TB)(VB − NB)I TB(VB + χB)I
√
TTB(V2B − 1)σz
0
√
T (1 − TB)(V2B − 1)σz
√
TTB(V2B − 1)σz T (VB + χ)I

, (C3)
where VB = TA(V + χA) is the modified variance of the
EPR state, and the corresponding noise parameters are TB =
TA(V2 − 1)/[T 2A(V + χA)2 − 1] and χB = [T 2A(V + χA)(VχA +
1)−V]/[TA(V2 −1)], leading to a modified variance of the an-
cillary EPR’ reading NB = TBχB/(1 − TB). It is easy to verify
that such replacement would lead to the same γAB as in Eq.
(4)
γAB =

TB(VB + χB)I
√
TTB(V2B − 1)σz√
TTB(V2B − 1)σz T (VB + χ)I

=
 VI
√
TTA(V2 − 1)σz√
TTA(V2 − 1)σz T [TA(V + χA) + χ]I
 ,(C4)
and is therefore able to describe the amplification process. In
order to make the model physical realizable, the parameters
also need to satisfy TB < 1 and χB ≥ (1 − TB)/TB. The first
inequality is easily recognized since now T 2A(V +χA)2 > TAV2
and TA > 1, leading to TA(V2 − 1) < T 2A(V + χA)2 − 1. For the
second inequality, by substituting TA, χA and V into it, we can
transform it into
χ2A + (V − 1)χA −
(TAV − 1)(TA − 1)
T 2A
≥ 0. (C5)
Given that χA satisfies χA ≥ (TA − 1)/TA when TA > 1, it
is easy to verify that the left hand side reaches its minimum
when χA = (TA − 1)/TA, and the minimum is just 0, which
proves the inequality.
With the above covariance matrix Eq. (C3), Eve’s knowl-
edge can be obtained.
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